This defense in depth discussion scenario is an intentional cybersecurity attack on the water utility’s SCADA system. It occurs during the fall after a dry summer in Fringe City. The water utility’s Information Technology (IT) person did not receive an expected pay raise and decides to reprogram the SCADA system to shut off the high-lift pumps. The operator’s familiarity with the SCADA system allows him to reprogram the alarms that typically notify operators of a high-lift pump failure. In addition, he prevents access to the SCADA system by others. A wildfire breaks out on the outskirts of the city. Please identify what type(s) of new countermeasures should have been implemented to prevent this cyber attack from occurring. Start a discussion thread and discuss what type(s) of new countermeasures should have been implemented to prevent the cyber attack described above from occurring. Be specific in recommending countermeasures for this scenario. You must do this following: 1) Create a new thread. As indicated above, Course : Emerging Threats and countermeas Programm of Study : Ph.D in Information Technology

In order to prevent the cyber attack described in the scenario, several new countermeasures should have been implemented. These countermeasures should address both technical and organizational aspects of cybersecurity.

On the technical side, a multi-layered defense approach known as defense in depth is crucial. This approach involves implementing multiple layers of security controls to protect the SCADA system from various types of attacks. The following countermeasures can be considered:

1. Access Control: The water utility should have implemented strong access control measures to prevent unauthorized access to the SCADA system. This could include implementing strong passwords, two-factor authentication, and role-based access control. By preventing unauthorized access, the IT person would not have been able to reprogram the system or prevent others from accessing it.

2. Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems (IDPS): IDPS can be deployed to monitor the network traffic and detect any suspicious activities or intrusion attempts. By detecting and alerting on the IT person’s reprogramming of the alarms and prevention of access to the system, the attack could have been prevented.

3. Network Segmentation: The SCADA system should have been isolated from the rest of the utility’s network through network segmentation. This would prevent an attacker from gaining access to the SCADA system through other vulnerable systems in the network.

4. System Monitoring: Continuous monitoring of the SCADA system’s activities and logs can help identify any unusual behavior or unauthorized access. By monitoring the system, the water utility would have been able to detect the IT person’s actions and prevent the attack.

On the organizational side, there are several countermeasures that should have been in place:

1. Employee Training and Awareness: Regular cybersecurity training should have been provided to the employees, including the IT person and the operator. This training should emphasize the importance of cybersecurity and the consequences of unauthorized actions. It would have made the IT person more aware of the potential harm that could be caused by tampering with the SCADA system.

2. Separation of Duties: Implementing a separation of duties policy ensures that no single employee has complete control over critical systems. In this scenario, if the IT person did not have the sole authority to reprogram the SCADA system and the operator was responsible for alarms, the attack would have been prevented.

3. Incident Response Plan: The water utility should have had a well-defined incident response plan in place. This plan would outline the procedures to be followed in the event of a cyber attack, including the steps to be taken to mitigate the attack and restore the normal functioning of the SCADA system.

In conclusion, to prevent the cyber attack described in the scenario, a combination of technical and organizational countermeasures should have been implemented. These countermeasures would have addressed access control, network segmentation, intrusion detection, system monitoring, employee training, separation of duties, and incident response planning. By implementing these countermeasures, the water utility could have significantly reduced the risk of such an attack occurring.